

















































































































































































4	Generically,	a	position	 is	enactivist	 if	 it	pursues	some	version	of	 the	claim	that	cognition	
unfolds	(is	enacted)	in	looping	interactions	between	an	active	organism	and	its	environment.	













































































































































































































































problem,	 a	domain	 consisting	of	 items	 taken	 to	be	 facts	 related	 to	 that	problem,	 general	
explanatory	factors	and	goals	providing	expectations	as	to	how	the	problem	is	to	be	solved,	
techniques	and	methods,	and,	sometimes,	but	not	always,	concepts,	laws	and	theories	which	
are	related	to	the	problem	and	which	attempt	to	realize	the	explanatory	goals’.	
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explained	by	the	details	of	scientific	practice,	rather	than	any	shared	rethinking	of	nature.	
Indeed,	Gallagher’s	own	work	provides	one	such	example.	Gallagher	and	Brøsted	Sørensen	
(2006:	130)	claim	that	the	question	of	the	contribution	of	phenomenology	to	cognitive	
science	is:	‘not	about	phenomenological	methods,	or	phenomenology	per	se,	but	about	the	
phenomenological	procedures	that	would	allow	phenomenology	to	be	used	in	the	
behavioural	and	cognitive	neurosciences…	[Phenomenology]	is,	in	effect,	a	way	of	
introducing	methodological	control	into	the	description	of	the	phenomena	(perception,	
memory,	proprioception,	action,	etc.)	that	cognitive	scientists	want	to	explain.’	Here,	then,	
phenomenology	is	useful	in	relation	to	a	specific	set	of	scientific	practices:	to	use	subjects’	
reports	of	their	own	experience,	as	part	of	cognitive-scientific	research,	it	is	important	to	
train	the	subjects	of	study	to	be	sensitive	observers	of	their	own	experiences,	so	that,	in	
consequence,	the	relevant	information	may	be	obtained	in	an	orderly	fashion.		
	
As	a	final	example	–	one	which	demonstrates	that	our	practice-driven	alternative	has	the	
advantage	of	accounting	not	only	for	phenomenological	enactivism,	but	also	for	other	cases	
of	collaboration	–	consider	Agre	and	Chapman’s	Pengi	(Agre	and	Chapman	1987).	The	goal	
of	this	research	was	to	develop	a	computer	program	that	would	avoid	certain	obstacles	
confronted	by	systems	developed	within	the	cognitivist	and	connectionist	traditions.	
According	to	Agre	and	Chapman,	both	of	these	orthodox	approaches	assume	that	action	is	
secondary	with	respect	to	cognition	and	so	should	be	explained	utilizing	machinery	that	has	
already	been	used	to	explain	cognition	(Agre	and	Chapman	1987:	268).	In	developing	an	
alternative,	action-led	approach,	Agre	was	inspired	by	Heideggerian	phenomenology	(in	
particular,	Heidegger’s	account	of	readiness-to-hand	–	see	Heidegger	1962).	Nonetheless,	
he	characterizes	the	contribution	of	phenomenology	as	a	kind	of	practical	prop.	As	he	puts	
it:	‘[b]etter	descriptions	of	everyday	life	do	not	disprove	technical	ideas,	but	they	do	
motivate	different	intuitions	and	they	also	help	evaluate	the	appeals	to	everyday	intuition	
that	are	found	throughout	AI	research’	(Agre	1997:	9).	As	far	as	we	can	tell,	at	no	point	in	
this	collaboration	does	a	rethinking	of	nature	so	as	to	include	irreducible	subjectivity,	or	
indeed	any	consideration	of	the	notion	of	nature,	play	any	role	in	grounding	the	relevance	
of	phenomenology	to	cognitive	science.	This	presents	Gallagher	with	a	dilemma.	He	might	
concede	that	this	particular	collaboration	does	not	involve	a	rethinking	of	nature,	but	
nevertheless	maintain	that	those	based	on	enactivist	phenomenology	do,	in	which	case	he	
would	also	have	to	accept	that	his	proposed	rethinking	of	nature	is	not	necessary	for	
phenomenology	to	be	relevant	to	cognitive	science.	Or	he	might	argue	that	although	cases	
such	as	that	of	Pengi	do	not	explicitly	involve	a	rethinking	of	nature,	they	do	so	implicitly,	in	
which	case	the	burden	of	proof	is	on	Gallagher	to	show	us	how.				
	
Up	to	this	point,	we	have	argued	that	fertile	collaborations	between	phenomenology	and	
cognitive	science	are,	pace	Gallagher,	not	necessarily	grounded	on	any	particular	notion	of	
nature.	Rather,	they	are	regulated	by	the	demands	of	successful	scientific	practice.	At	this	
point,	however,	Pollard’s	detranscendentalization	worry	is	snapping	at	our	heels.	Not	only	
that,	but	the	framing	of	things	in	terms	of	scientific	practice	and	its	aims	might	imply	that	
phenomenology	is	not	only	fully	detranscendentalized,	and	thus	turned	into	
phenomenological	psychology,	but	is	entirely	subsumed	by	scientific	practice	and	its	
demands.	In	truth,	however,	neither	of	these	outcomes	is	mandatory,	or	so	we	will	argue.	
	
	 11	
The	term	‘phenomenology’	names	a	philosophical	tradition	and,	more	importantly,	it	names	
a	way	a	doing	philosophy.	If	there	is	a	collaboration	between	phenomenology	and	cognitive	
science,	it	must	be	understood	in	line	with	the	defining	features	of	phenomenology	as	a	
philosophical	endeavour.	To	a	reasonable	first	approximation,	a	philosophical	analysis	is	an	
instance	of	phenomenological	research	when	it	has	(versions	of)	the	following	two	features:	
	
i. Thematical	Feature	
As	mentioned	earlier,	phenomenology	is	concerned	with	the	conditions	of	possibility	
of	intelligibility	(i.e.,	sense	making).	It	is	in	this	sense	that	phenomenology	is	a	
transcendental	enterprise,	although	the	precise	meanings	of	the	terms	
‘transcendence’	and	‘transcendental’	in	each	phenomenological	project	require	
further	specification.	Phenomenological	projects	set	out	to	give	an	account	of	
consciousness	or	of	existence,	and	what	is	characteristic	of	both	is	that	they	name	the	
phenomenon	of	openness	to	the	world:	our	thoughts	and	actions	are	directed	
towards	the	world.	Giving	an	account	of	our	meaningful	interactions	with	the	world	
requires	an	account	of	the	structure	of	this	directedness.	At	this	point	we	can	claim	
that	phenomenology	is	concerned	with	scientific	research	in	at	least	the	sense	that	
science	constitutes	a	meaningful	interaction	with	the	world.	Phenomenology	exposes	
the	conditions	of	possibility	of	scientific	practice	as	something	that	is	given	within	a	
determinate	context	and	that	is	traversed	by	socio-historical	conditions.	
	
ii. Methodological	Feature	
To	account	for	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	intelligibility,	phenomenology	requires	
the	philosopher	to	take	a	specific	stance.	This	stance	is	defined	by	a	breaking	out	
from	the	natural	attitude	into	the	transcendental	attitude,	where	the	latter	brackets	
the	contingent	occurrent	aspects	of	the	objects	that	constitute	the	realm	of	the	
natural,	in	order	to	obtain	the	conditions	of	their	givenness.	But	even	though	
phenomenology	exhibits	a	critical	stance	towards	the	natural	attitude	(in	that	it	is	not	
naïve	in	relation	to	the	natural	attitude’s	objects	and	theoretical	presuppositions),	its	
point	of	departure	remains	that	very	attitude.	Because	of	this,	phenomenology	
requires	an	adequate	description	of	the	natural	attitude	from	which	to	begin	its	
analysis.		
	
So	far,	so	good,	but	what	exactly	is	the	natural	attitude?	In	answering	this	question,	we	are	
about	to	say	something	controversial.	As	we	understand	it,	the	natural	attitude	
encompasses	all	our	pre-ontological	(prior	to	phenomenological	analysis)	interactions	with	
the	world,	and,	as	such,	it	includes	both	the	attitude	of	everyday	life	and	the	attitude	of	the	
scientist.	Given	this,	cognitive	science	itself	emerges	as	a	component	of	the	natural	attitude,	
the	attitude	with	which	phenomenological	theorizing	necessarily	always	begins.	This	is	a	
controversial	position	because	it	conflicts	with	‘classical’	phenomenology.	For	example,	
Husserl	(1989:	174)	not	only	distinguishes	between	the	natural	and	the	naturalistic	attitude,	
with	the	former	naming	our	everyday	experience	and	the	latter	the	attitude	of	the	scientist,	
but	also	claims	that	these	are	opposing	attitudes,	in	that	we	do	not	experience	the	natural	
objects	that	are	studied	by	the	scientist.	And	Heidegger,	despite	engaging	in	discussions	
with	science	(Heidegger	1995,	2001),	would	not	accept	that	phenomenology	departs	from	
scientific	studies,	but	only	from	an	analysis	of	our	everyday	experience.	Notice,	however,	
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that	our	alternative	proposal	does	not	recommend	an	uncritical	acceptance	of	what	science	
tells	us	(a	kind	of	unreconstructed	naturalistic	attitude),	but	only	that	science	provides	some	
of	the	necessary	starting	conditions	for	phenomenological	analysis.6	This	is	in	line	with	
Merleau-Ponty’s	claim	that	while	a	‘science	without	philosophy	would	literally	not	know	
what	it	was	talking	about,	[a]	philosophy	without	methodical	exploration	of	phenomena	
[e.g.,	without	science]	would	end	up	with	nothing	but	formal	truths,	which	is	to	say,	errors’	
(Merleau-Ponty	1964:	97).	However,	the	envisaged	relationship	between	phenomenology	
and	cognitive	science	makes	sense	only	if	we	recognize	the	transcendental	dimension	of	the	
former.	So	the	relevance	of	phenomenology	to	cognitive	science,	as	we	have	characterized	
it	in	the	context	of	scientific	practice,	does	not	result	in	a	detranscendentalization	of	
phenomenology,	but	instead	in	an	affirmation	of	its	transcendental	aspect.		
	
What	this	suggests	is	that	collaborations	between	phenomenology	and	cognitive	science	are	
not	all	of	one	kind.	A	specific	collaborative	effort	could	be	shaped	either	as	a	
phenomenological	task	or	as	a	scientific	task.	As	practices,	phenomenology	and	science	
have	different	goals,	questions,	methodologies,	and	techniques.	Any	collaboration	will	be	
regulated	by	the	practice	within	which	it	is	framed,	rather	than	by	the	ultimate	authority	of	
one	discipline	over	the	other.	This	means	that	although	there	is	always	a	power	imbalance	
in	force,	just	who	holds	power	will	depend	on	the	kind	of	task	that	is	being	carried	out.	This	
conclusion	risks	a	Stendera-like	objection	(see	above)	that	any	power	imbalance	is	in	
tension	with	the	possibility	of	genuine	collaboration.	However,	without	any	regulation	over	
what	determines	a	practice	or	a	task,	it	would	be	impossible	to	perform	it.	This	is	not	the	
claim	that	it	is	always	the	scientist,	or	indeed	always	the	phenomenologist,	who	calls	the	
shots,	but	the	idea	that	there	is	a	symmetrical	asymmetry	between	the	two.	That	is,	while	
neither	science	nor	phenomenology	enjoys	global	authority	over	the	other	(hence	a	
symmetry),	the	regulating	principles	of	some	particular	collaboration,	as	determined	by	the	
research	task	and	goals	in	force,	will	impose	constraints	that	may	give	one	partner	local	
authority	over	the	other	(hence	an	asymmetry).				
	
So,	does	our	foregrounding	of	scientific	and	phenomenological	practice	give	us	what’s	
needed?	On	the	positive	side,	the	resulting	proposal	does	not	in	itself	require	the	rethinking	
of	nature,	so,	in	principle,	it	is	consistent	with	the	classic	scientific	conception	of	nature.	
Indeed,	if,	in	some	collaboration	between	phenomenology	and	cognitive	science,	the	
metaphysical	question	of	how	to	conceptualize	nature	plays	no	role	in	the	unfolding	of	the	
relevant	practices	(see,	e.g.,	the	case	of	Pengi),	then	it	plays	no	role	in	the	motivation	for,	or	
in	the	regulation	of,	that	collaboration.	As	a	further	bonus,	the	proposal	delivers	the	
relevance	of	phenomenology	to	cognitive	science	while	preserving	the	transcendental	
character	of	the	former,	so	any	worries	from	the	side	of	phenomenology	that	turn	on	the	
risk	of	detranscendentalization	are	defused.	On	the	negative	side,	this	way	of	warding	off	
the	spectre	of	detranscendentalization	involves	the	removal	of	even	the	arguably	modest	
naturalistic	demand	that	genuine	conflicts	between	philosophy	and	science	place	a	global	
obligation	on	the	philosopher,	but	not	on	the	scientist,	to	revisit	her	claims.	This	means	that	
																																																						
6	As	an	example	of	research	with	this	profile,	consider	an	analysis	by	De	Preester	(2008)	in	
which	a	consideration	of	empirical	scientific	research	into	mirror	neurons	is	used	explicitly	to	
drive	the	phenomenological	claim	that	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	self-other	understanding	
as	world-mediated	presupposes	a	Husserlian	notion	of	pairing	or	bodily	similarity.	
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the	position	on	offer	no	longer	counts	as	a	species	of	even	the	minimal	kind	of	naturalism	
that	we	explored	in	our	first	alternative	proposal.	To	the	extent	that	naturalism	is	a	goal	–	
and	some	might	hold	that	any	philosophy	that	truly	wants	to	hang	out	with	cognitive	
science	had	better	have	naturalist	credentials	–	this	is,	without	doubt,	a	cost	to	be	paid.		
	
5.	Concluding	Remarks	
	
The	advent	of	research	at	the	interface	between	phenomenology	and	cognitive	science	is	an	
exciting	intellectual	development.	Nevertheless,	such	work	faces	a	good	deal	of	in-principle	
resistance	from	both	sides	of	that	interface.	Because	this	resistance	exists,	Gallagher’s	
articulation	of	a	philosophical	position	that	would	mandate	the	kind	of	research	in	question	
is	much-needed.	However,	as	we	have	argued,	Gallagher’s	distinctive	proposal	for	a	
rethinking	of	nature	is	not	the	only	potential	source	for	such	a	mandate.	Minimal	naturalism	
and	a	practice-centred	analysis	of	the	phenomenology-science	interface	are	competing	
options.	Here	we	have	not	settled	the	issue	of	which	of	these	three	options	should	be	
selected,	but	we	have	made	a	start	on	the	task	of	understanding	their	advantages	and	
disadvantages.		
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